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Conditional transfer programs are becoming a common approach to influence 
household decisions.  The evidence to date is that these programs are good at 
promoting certain outcomes such as school attendance, but that other outcomes 
such as reducing child labor are more difficult to achieve.  This study examines 
the impact of Superémonos, a conditional transfer program in Costa Rica, which 
provides poor families with a subsidy for the purchase of food conditional upon 
children regularly attending school.  Using three different empirical techniques—
simple comparison of mean outcomes, regression analysis and propensity score 
matching—we examine the program’s impact on school attendance, performance 
in school and child labor.  We find strong evidence that the program achieves its 
goal of improving school attendance and much weaker evidence regarding school 
performance.  The program does not reduce the likelihood that youth will work.  
These findings are discussed in the context of the results from impact evaluations 
of other conditional transfer programs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are rapidly populating the landscape of Latin 
American social programs.  CCT programs transfer resources to poor families on the condition 
that the families engage in some behavior:  sending their children to school, taking children to 
health clinics for check-ups, or some other action.  Most transfer programs have two principal 
components: an education component and a health component (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003).  The 
former is usually focused on primary and secondary-age students, while the latter focuses on 
infants and very young children. CCT programs have been initiated in Brazil (Bolsa Escola and 
PETI), Colombia (Familias en Acción), Mexico (PROGRESA, recently renamed 
Oportunidades), Honduras (PRAF), and Nicaragua (Red de Protección Social).
2  The initial wave 
of evaluations of these programs has revealed promising results with regards to improved levels 
of consumption, reduced incidence of poverty, and increased school attendance (Rawlings and 
Rubio, 2003; Skoufias, 2001).
3    
At the same time, it is not clear that cash transfer programs, without the addition of 
complementary activities such as after-school programs, can affect the problem of child labor.  
The two cases in which CCT programs have produced documented reductions in child labor in 
the Americas—PROGRESA in Mexico and PETI in Brazil—are precisely those cases where 
complementary activities such as after-school programs were part of the education component 
(Yap, Sedlacek and Orazem, 2002; Pianto and Soares, 2003; Skoufias, 2001). In only one case, 
                                                 
2 Bolsa Escola offers cash transfers to families conditional upon school attendance. PETI (Programa de Eliminaçao 
do Trabalho Infantil—Program for the Eradication of Child Labor) provides cash stipends to poor families living in 
areas of high rates of child labor, on the condition that their children attend school and participate in an after-school 
program.  Familias en Acción (Families in Action) provides two types of cash transfers to low-income families: i) to 
families with children under seven years old, conditional upon children receiving health and wellness checks, and ii) 
to families with grade school and high school-aged children, conditional upon school attendance.  PRAF is the 
Programa de Asignación Familiar (Family Allowance Program).  This program involves two transfers to families 
living in areas of concentrated poverty: a nutrition and health transfer for families with pregnant women and 
children 3 years old and younger, and a school cash transfer for households with children between the ages of 6 and 
12. It also contains two “supply-side” transfers to organizations in the target areas: i) to parent and teacher 
associations and for teacher training, and ii) to health clinics.  PROGRESA is the Programa de Educación, Salud y 
Alimentación  (Education, Health and Nutrition Program), which is now called Oportunidades.  It offers cash 
transfers, nutritional supplements, and preventive health care as well as educational programs about health and 
hygiene.  The Red de Protección Social (Social Protection Network) is a pilot project which offers cash transfers 
conditional upon families participating in child growth monitoring and immunization programs, as well as regular 
adult attendance to training sessions on health and nutrition. 
3 Oportunidades, the more recent CCT program in Mexico, expanded Progresa to urban areas and included other 
modifications to the original program.  Oportunidades has not yet been evaluated; thus this paper restricts the 
discussion of results to the rural program Progresa.   6
from Bangladesh, have researchers documented that a stand-alone transfer program (in this case 
an in-kind transfer of food) led to a decline in child labor (Ravaillon and Wodon, 1999).
4 
This paper contributes to this expanding literature on conditional transfer programs by 
evaluating a program that to date has not been evaluated, Costa Rica’s Superémonos (“We will 
overcome” in Spanish).  The program provides food coupons to poor families, conditional upon a 
commitment of these families to enroll all their children in school.  The program does not have 
as an explicit goal the reduction of child labor.   
We gauge the program’s impact on three outcomes of interest:  school attendance, school 
performance and child labor, using three different methodologies to ensure a triangulation of 
results. These methodologies include a “naïve” comparison of means of program participants 
with non-participants, a regression approach which attempts to identify the determinants of child 
labor, school attendance and school performance (including among these factors participation in 
the programs of interest), and a rather new statistical methodology called “propensity score 
matching,” which compares the outcomes of program participants to those of non-participants 
who are carefully matched so that they have similar ex-ante probabilities of participating in the 
programs.   The fact that Superémonos imposes no requirements on children’s pre-program work 
or school behavior is a particular part of the program design that lends itself well to ex-post 
evaluation.   
Three levels of results are of interest.  First, of course, is the impact of the program on the 
school attendance, educational performance and child labor in Costa Rica.  A second interesting 
issue is whether in-kind transfers of food (as provided by Superémonos) are as effective as 
transfers of cash (as provided by the majority of conditional transfer programs in the region) in 
improving school attendance and performance.  Finally, the paper will contribute to the debate 
about whether conditional transfers by themselves (i.e., without complementary interventions) 
are able to influence household decisions on labor force participation of children. 
The paper is structured as follows.  The following section contains a description of the 
Superémonos program.  Section 3 describes the data and methodologies used in the evaluation of 
the program’s impact. Section 4 presents the statistical and econometric results, and Section 5 
contains the conclusions.  
                                                 
4 Ravaillon and Wodon find that receiving an extra 100 kg of rice decreases the probability of child labor by 4 
percent, evaluated at the mean.   7
2. Superémonos:  A Conditional Transfer Program  
 
Superemónos is a program developed by the Instituto Mixto de Apoyo Social (IMAS), the 
institution responsible for leading and coordinating anti-poverty programs in Costa Rica.   
Superémonos provides a monthly food coupon to poor households on the condition that all 
children in the household between the ages of 6 and 18 attend school.  Participating households 
receive a coupon worth 10,000 colones per month (approximately US $30) for the 10 months 
comprising the school year, which can be redeemed for food in any supermarket.  In 2001, 
12,234 families participated in the program (IMAS, 2001). 
Parents or guardians are required to sign a commitment agreement (“compromiso de 
participación”), in which they agree to: i) keep all of their children in school; ii) not use coupons 
to buy liquor, cigarettes, drugs or luxury items; iii) report abuse of the program by other 
beneficiaries; and iv) not transfer the coupon to third parties.  Support can be discontinued if 
these and other conditions are not met.  Two progress reports per year document whether 
children are regularly attending school.
5  It is important to note that the program does not require 
that the children pass the school year or stop working, but simply that they attend school. 
As is the case for other IMAS programs, households must pass a means test in order to 
participate in Superémonos.  Information on potential beneficiaries is collected in a questionnaire 
and entered into a database called SIPO (Sistema de Información sobre la Población Objetivo—
Information System on the Target Population), which contains data on more than 250,000 
households.  Eligibility is determined by a household’s SIPO score, which is based upon five 
factors:  i) occupation of household head; ii) quality of housing stock; iii) household income; iv) 
educational level of household head; and v) net worth of the household.   
 
                                                 
5 Other reasons for discontinuing support are:  i) children do not continue to reside with parents or guardians; ii) 
coupons are not picked up by beneficiaries within 20 days of their being available; or iii) false information was 
given to IMAS in order to qualify for the program.   8
3. Data  and  Methodology 
 
Data were collected on program participants and non-participants by a custom-designed sample 
survey.  Basic contact information for program participants came from lists of beneficiaries for 
the year 2001 provided by IMAS.  We conducted the survey of beneficiaries and non-
participants in three neighboring urban areas of Costa Rica:  Alajuela, Cartago and San Jose.  In 
all, 746 participating families and 1,042 non-participating families were surveyed.
6 
The most rigorous way to examine the effectiveness of a program is by random 
assignment of individuals to treatment and control groups before program participation begins; 
this approach allows evaluators to attribute the differences in outcomes for these two groups, 
with a great degree of confidence, to participation in the program (or non-participation).     
Unfortunately, such random assignment frequently is not feasible in social programs.   
Intentionally excluding eligible individuals from a program to form an ideal control group 
presents an ethical dilemma.  In addition, random assignment is often politically intractable:  
individuals excluded initially from participating (assigned to the control group) may lobby 
successfully to be included from the outset.
7  
Random assignment did not take place in Superémonos program.  Since random 
assignment did not occur, we constructed the control group after the fact.  This control group was 
drawn from families from the same communities and neighborhoods as program participants. 
Our goal in constructing the control group was to ensure that non-participants resembled our 
treatment group of participants as closely as possible along a key set of demographic and socio-
economic variables that would not be affected by program participation.  Care was taken to 
ensure that, as a group, the age and sex of children in the control group matched those of 
Superémonos participants.  In addition, non-participating families were selected so that their 
neighborhood, educational level of the mother, and access to electric service mirrored that of 
Superémonos participants.
8  Table 1 indicates that, according to these variables, the 
                                                 
6 Responses to questions in the survey revealed that some of these families identified as non-beneficiaries (i.e., not 
on the list of program beneficiaries) identified themselves as program beneficiaries.  These families were excluded 
from the control group.  
7 This is sometimes dealt with, albeit imperfectly, by allowing those in the control group to participate in the 
program at some future date (termed “cross-over evaluation design”). 
8 Access to electric service was broken into two categories: 1) having metered electricity or 2) having non-metered 
electricity or no electricity at all. The second category represents about 4 percent of the households in the sample.   9
demographics and socio-economic status of beneficiary families (as indicated by the list 
provided by IMAS) are quite similar to those of non-participating families.  
The survey instrument collected detailed information pertaining to one randomly selected 
child in the household, as well as information about other family members and the dwelling.  The 
mother or father was asked whether the child regularly attended school during the 2002 school 
year and whether the child regularly attended school during the previous school year (2001).  We 
also included a question about whether the child attended school in the week prior to the survey 
in 2002, which served as a consistency check for the more general question on attendance.
9   
Among children aged 10-16, 90 percent were reported to be regularly attending school in 
2002, while 88.7 percent were reported to have attended school last week.  The parents were also 
asked if their children worked in the week prior to the survey in 2002, with the definition of 
work including all types of activities that generate income (in-cash or in-kind) for the family.
10   
Once data were collected on program participants and a socio-economically similar group 
of non-participants, three different methodological approaches were used to gauge the effect of 
Superémonos on the outcome variables of interest (work or not, attend school or not, pass school 
year or not).  First, the mean values of the outcome variables were compared between the 
treatment and control groups.  Second, regression analysis was used to estimate reduced form 
equations, with the outcome variable of interest as the dependent variable.  A variable measuring 
participation in Superémonos is included as one of the explanatory variables, in order to 
determine whether program participation affects the outcomes of interest after controlling for 
other factors that might influence the outcome. Third, a matching methodology was used in 
which participants are explicitly matched with an individual in the non-participating group, in 
order to ensure that the outcomes are being compared between individuals who have similar a 
priori propensities of participating in the program.
11  Essentially, this methodology models the 
determinants of program participation and estimates a “propensity score” for each individual 
                                                 
9 There were two waves of the survey.  The first wave was in April and May of 2002, and the second wave in 
August 2002. The cost per survey was approximately US $13.  While the availability of the high quality database of 
beneficiaries (SAB) at IMAS greatly facilitated the implementation of this study, the fact that Costa Rica does not 
have a standard system of addresses, relying instead on descriptive characteristics of locales, greatly increased the 
cost of fielding the survey. 
10 Thus, unpaid work in family businesses was captured work.  Time spent on unpaid domestic activities such as 
babysitting and cleaning was measured in another question.   
11 This propensity score is modeled as a function of a large number of explanatory variables.  Clearly, these 
variables must not themselves be affected by program participation.   10
(both participants and non-participants) that predicts the probability of participation.  Using this 
propensity score, the group of participants (treatment group) is matched with a comparison group 
(control group), and the mean values of the outcome variables are compared between the 
treatment and control groups in order to gauge program effectiveness.
12   
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages.  A comparison of means is the simplest 
possible approach.  But while its simplicity is a virtue, it has quite serious disadvantages.  Most 
important among them is that there is no way to control for other factors which affect the 
outcomes of interest and which potentially may vary between the treatment and control groups. 
Regression analysis has the advantage of being widely used and easily understood.  Since 
program participation is only one of many variables that may affect the outcomes of interest, 
using this approach allows us to gauge the importance of program participation in comparison to 
a large number of other variables, some of which can be directly targeted by public policy.  But 
regression analysis rests on strong assumptions about the parametric distribution of the error 
term.   
Propensity score matching has one key advantage: the methodology only compares 
observations that are very similar in terms of the probability of program participation.  Treatment 
observations that do not have a sufficiently close match in terms of the probability of program 
participation are dropped from the comparison. At the same time, propensity score matching has 
a serious disadvantage:  in order to find statistically significant differences between treatment 
and control groups, the sample size must be larger than for the regression approach.  Given that 
each methodology has advantages and disadvantages, we opt to present results from all these 
approaches in this paper.     
  
4. Empirical  Results 
 
Unadjusted Differences in Mean Outcomes 
 
Before presenting the results from more sophisticated techniques, it is useful to consider the 
differences in the mean outcomes across the groups without controlling for other characteristics 
of the household or child.  Table 2 displays differences in mean outcomes between beneficiaries 
                                                 
12  See Annex 1 for a more detailed description of this methodology.   11
(treatment group) and non-beneficiaries (control group) for children between ages 13 and 16.
13  
There are two outcome measures for each year: attending school and passing the grade for the 
2001 school year, and attending school and working in the week prior to the survey for the 2002 
school year.
14   
Measurement error produces slight inconsistencies between the list of beneficiaries 
provided by IMAS for 2001 and the families who report in the surveys having received 
Superémonos in 2001.  We define the treatment group for the 2001 outcomes according to 
whether the family has reported receiving Superémonos in 2001.  The control group for 2001 
was similarly defined as any family who reported not receiving Superémonos that year.
15 
Note that in defining the treatment group for 2002, a new survey was not drawn from a 
beneficiary list for 2002.   The treatment group for 2002 consists of those who report they have 
received Superémonos benefits in 2002.  The difference in sample size between the treatment 
groups in 2001 and 2002 largely reflects that families are less likely to participate in 
Superémonos as children enter their late teenage years and drop out of school.    
Mean attendance rates for Superémonos beneficiaries in 2001 were approximately four 
percent higher than for non-beneficiaries.  While the mean passing rates for beneficiaries was 
also about 4 percent higher, this difference was not quite statistically significant.  In terms of 
outcomes for 2002, neither attendance rates nor the probability of working in the week prior to 




The comparison of unadjusted means is valid if the distributions of characteristics (observed and 
unobserved) are the same for the treatment group and control group.  While great care was taken 
                                                 
13 We limit our sample to children ages 13 to 16 for two reasons.  First, we have few observations for youth over the 
age of 16.  Second, for ages 10-12, while the sample size is sufficient, the probability of school attendance is close to 
the maximum of 100 percent; with 98 percent of children attending school, there is little scope for the program to 
increase this percentage.  There is some scope for the program to have an impact on the age group 13-16 since the 
percentage attending school in both comparison groups is lower at 89 percent. 
14 Data on work experience was not collected for the preceding year due to potentially serious problems with recall 
bias.  Data on passing is not available for the current year, since the school year had not yet ended at the time of the 
survey. We also performed analysis with a second, more “pure” control group whose members not only did not 
receive Superémonos last year, but also did not receive a monetary scholarship through the National Fund for 
Scholarships (Fondo Nacional de Becas, FONABE).  The results from this analysis were quite consistent with those 
reported here. 
15 I.e., those who were on the IMAS list of beneficiaries for 2001 but responded that they did not receive benefits in 
2001 were included in the control group.   12
to draw the control group from a similar population (see Section 3), the populations may differ in 
some characteristics.  In this sub-section we report the results of a regression analysis that 
attempts to control for these potential differences.
16 
Tables 3-6 provide the results of multiple regression analyses of the effect of receiving 
Superémonos on school attendance, promotion, and child labor, controlling for other factors that 
might influence these outcomes.
17 The outcomes are binary (e.g., worked last week or not, 
attended school last year or not, etc.), and thus the probit specification is used.  Marginal effects 
of the explanatory variables are reported, since these effects cannot be inferred directly from the 
regression coefficients.    
Receiving Superémonos in 2001 had a significant effect on school attendance (Table 3) 
and on passing the grade (Table 4).  Program participation is associated with a 2.94 percentage 
point increase in the probability of attending school and a 4.83 percentage point increase in the 
probability of passing the grade for these children who were ages 12-15 during the 2001 school 
year. It is interesting to compare these marginal effects with those of other explanatory variables.  
In the case of school attendance, the marginal effect of Superémonos is equivalent to increasing 
the mother’s educational level by six years.  On the other hand, an increase in one year of the 
child’s age reduces the likelihood of attendance roughly 1.7 times as much as participation in 
Superémonos.
18 In the case of passing the school year, the result is similar: an increase in the 
child’s age of one year has a larger (negative) marginal impact than the (positive) marginal effect 
of participating in Superémonos.  
In terms of effect in 2002 when the children are ages 13-16 years of age, Superémonos 
increases the probability of attending school by 4.45 percentage points.  The marginal effect is 
equivalent to roughly four additional years of mother’s education, but only one-half year of 
additional age of the child.  The probit analysis, however, does not detect any impact of 
Superémonos on the probability of working in the week prior to the survey.   
                                                 
16 In the next sub-section, we report results produced by propensity score matching, another technique for 
controlling for these potential differences. 
17 These other variables must be not be affected by program participation in order not to produce multicollinearity 
among the regressors.  
18 This is the average marginal effect of one additional year.  Clearly, the effect will be larger the older is the child, 
since the opportunity cost of continuing schooling rises with age. Thus, the size of the marginal effect of 
Superémonos versus the marginal effect of an additional year may constitute evidence that the amount of the food 
coupon is insufficient to offset the higher opportunity costs, especially at older ages.   13
These regression results support the differences in mean attendance rates reported in 
Table 2 on the basis of naïve comparison of means, but suggest a smaller marginal effect of the 
program.  The regression results provide some evidence that the program has a positive effect on 
passing the grade, an effect that did not quite achieve statistical significance in the naïve 
comparison of means.   
 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
In this section we present the results from a technique called propensity score matching 
(henceforth, PSM).  This technique is gaining increasing acceptance as a tool for program 
evaluation; it is appealing because it provides a way to ensure that treatment and control groups 
are similar not only in observable characteristics, but also in individuals’ likelihood of 
participating in the program that is being evaluated.
19  A detailed description of the steps in 
implementing this methodology is provided in Appendix A; here, we note only that: 
 
i)  Each individual in the treatment group is “matched” with one or more 
individuals in the control group who have similar probabilities of participating 
in the program based on observable characteristics;
20  
ii) Matching is accomplished by estimating a limited dependent variable 
regression for program participation, in which both participants and non-
participants are included.  In this paper, the probability of participating in 
Superémonos was modeled using a probit equation with the following 
explanatory variables: types of walls, potable water, working electricity, 
canton, crowding of residence, home ownership, age of child, mother’s years 
of education and the presence/absence of the mother from the residence.  The 
predicted values for each individual (both participants and non-participants) 
are the a priori probabilities of participating in the program.  
                                                 
19 By definition, individuals in the control group do not participate in the program.  “Likelihood” in this sense is the 
a priori probability of participation before a participation decision is made, based on observable characteristics. 
20 If each individual in the treatment group is matched with one individual in the control group, it is termed “one-to-
one” matching.  It is possible to match each individual in the treatment group to more than one individual in the 
control group; this is termed “n-to-one matching”, where n is the number of individuals in the control group paired 
with each observation in the treatment group.  We report results from one-to-one matching in this paper, but results 
from five-to-one matching were quite similar.   14
iii) The methodology requires that the range of a priori probabilities be similar for 
treatment and control groups. Appendix B provides evidence that areas of 
common support exist for our treatment and control group. 
iv) The distribution of propensity scores (probability of participation) for the 
treated and untreated groups have areas in common which allows for the 
construction of an appropriate control group.  This is what is known in the 
PSM literature as the “areas of common support.” 
v)  The number of observations from the control group effectively used in the 
analysis is smaller than in the regression analysis because the methodology 
matches each observation in the treatment group with the observation(s) from 
the control group that has or have the most similar a priori probability of 
participating in the Superémonos program.  In other words, some observations 
from the control group are not utilized, and this accounts for the smaller 
sample size.  
vi) Any observations from the treatment group that did not find a match within a 
five percentage-point window were thrown out; this resulted in the loss of 
only one observation from the treatment group for 2001. 
 
Before presenting the results from this methodology, it is important to note one caveat:  
PSM requires much larger sample sizes than standard parametric methods, and our sample sizes 
may not always be sufficiently large enough to demonstrate significant differences across 
groups.    
Table 7 presents the results of the one-to-one PSM analysis.  Superémonos is shown to 
have had a statistically significant impact on attending school in 2001, raising the probability of 
attendance by five percentage points.  No significant effect was found on the probability of 
passing the grade.  For the 2002 school year, the matching methodology finds a significant effect 
on the probability of attending school—an increase of 8.7 percent—but no impact on the 
probability of working in the week prior to the survey.   The results of the PSM analysis confirm 
the findings of the regression analysis regarding the impact of Superémonos on school 
attendance.  The marginal impacts for 2001 and 2002, however, are approximately twice as large 
using the PSM methodology.  Also consistent with the regression analysis is the finding that   15
participation in Superémonos has no impact on child labor. Unlike the regression analysis, 
however, the PSM does not find any statistically significant impact on the probability of passing 




This paper examines the impact of the Superémonos program on children’s school and work 
outcomes in Costa Rica.  Table 8 provides a summary of the results from the various 
methodologies used in the paper.  The first important conclusion is that the program is quite 
successful in achieving its stated goal of increasing school attendance.  Depending on the 
methodology used, program beneficiaries are between 2.9 and 8.7 percentage points more likely 
to be attending school than non-beneficiaries.  This impact is all the more impressive in Costa 
Rica, a country with quite high enrollment figures to begin with.  
There is much less evidence that the program increases the likelihood that students pass 
the grade.  In fact, only the probit regression analysis detected such an impact.  Thus, we are left 
to conclude that Superémonos beneficiaries are just about as likely to pass the grade as similar 
individuals attending school but not participating in the program.  We must be careful in 
interpreting this result; it emphatically is not evidence of the ineffectiveness of Superémonos in 
increasing the educational attainment of children; rather, it means that the increase in years of 
completed schooling of program beneficiaries will come from their attending school at higher 
rates, rather than progressing through grades at a faster pace. 
While the program appears to be achieving its primary objective of raising school 
attendance and educational attainment among poor children, there is no evidence that the 
program decreases child labor. As was made clear in the introduction, reducing child labor is not 
an explicit objective of the Superémonos program. 
How effective is Superémonos, an in-kind transfer program, compared to other 
conditional  cash transfer programs in increasing school attendance?  PROGRESA raised 
enrollment (not attendance) rates by between 0.74 and 1.07 percentage points for boys, and from 
0.96 to 1.45 percentage points for girls at the primary level.  At the secondary level, the effects 
ranged from 3.5 to 5.8 percentage points for boys and 7.2 to 9.3 percentage points for girls.  In 
Nicaragua, the Red de Protección Social produced even more dramatic results:  an increase in 
enrollment rates for primary school students of almost 22 percentage points (Rawlings and   16
Rubio, 2003).   Our estimates for the attendance impacts of Superémonos range from 2.4 to 5.0 
percent percentage points for students aged 13 to 16, corresponding in Costa Rica to the first four 
of the five years of secondary school for students with normal age-to-grade progression.  These 
are slightly lower percentage point gains than reported for PROGRESA and significantly lower 
than for Red de Protección Social.   
Does this mean that in-kind transfers are inherently less effective than cash transfers?  
Not necessarily.  Levels of school attendance in Costa Rica are significantly higher than in either 
Mexico or Nicaragua; if one assumes, as is plausible, that the remaining non-attendees in Costa 
Rica have either higher opportunity costs or lower returns to education than their peers who are 
already enrolled, then it is not surprising that it becomes increasingly difficult—and expensive—
to register further gains in school attendance. Any serious comparative analysis would also need 
to take into account the amount of the transfers and the fidelity of program execution.  But more 
fundamentally, the most fertile laboratory for comparing in-kind to cash transfers will be within 
countries, rather than among countries.  Inter-country comparisons of programs are simply 
fraught with too many confounding effects. 
Can conditional transfer programs affect child labor without complementary activities 
such as after school programs? As the cliché goes, the jury is still out. The evidence reported 
here from Costa Rica is that this in-kind transfer program does not affect child labor at all.  
Evidence from PROGRESA in Mexico and PETI in Brazil suggest that cash transfers, combined 
with complementary initiatives, can significantly affect rates of child labor.
21  Might stand-alone 
transfer programs have some impact in rural areas and in countries where the prevalence of child 
labor is significantly higher than in urban Costa Rica?  Perhaps, but more research will need to 
be conducted to document these impacts. 
                                                 
21 In the case of PETI, attending after-school sessions was required which effectively limited the available time for 
working. Hours of work were halved, and the probability of working was reduced by at least 5 percentage points 
(Yap, Sedlacek and Orazem, 2002).  In the case of PROGRESA, the additional interventions came primarily in the 
form of home visits by community promoters, nutritional interventions and health seminars.  The probability of 
working fell by approximately 10-15 percent for beneficiaries ages 8 to 17, with larger effects found for children 
ages 12-15.     17
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Table 1.  Mean Values for Treatment and Control Groups 
    
Superémonos 
participants*   
Non-
participants** 
          
Number of total observations   746    1032 
Average age of child     12.90    12.95 
Percentage female     50.27    48.55 
Percentage in San Jose     60.19    56.88 
Percentage in Alajuela     6.03    4.94 
Percentage in Cartago     33.78    38.18 
Percentage of mothers with            
  incomplete primary education   36.46    35.76 
Percentage of households           




*  from IMAS list of participants. 
** not on IMAS list. 
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Table 2. Differences in Outcomes across Treatment and Control Groups in Urban Areas of San 
Jose, Alajuela and Cartago: No Controls across Samples 
 
       difference 
  number of  Number of  mean of  mean of  in 
 observations  observations  observations observations  means 
  in control   In treatment  in control  in treatment   (treatment 
 group  group  group  group  -control) 
        
Treatment: Received Superémonos  
  in 2001 School Year
1      
          
Attend last year (2001)  691 419  0.899  0.938  0.039** 
          
          
Pass last year (2001)  615 390  0.777  0.818  0.041 
          
Treatment: Received Superémonos  
  Again in 2002 School Year
2   
          
          
Attend this year (2002)  904 206  0.8385  0.8689  0.030 
          
          
Work last week (2002)  904 206  0.0841  0.0922  0.008 
          
         
Notes:                   
* Difference in mean between treatment and control group is significant at .01 level.       
** Difference in mean between treatment and control group is significant at .05 level.       
*** Difference in mean between treatment and control group is significant at .10 level.       
1   Students aged 12-15; control group composed of individuals who did receive Superémonos in 2001.     
2   Students aged 13-16; control group composed of individuals who did not receive Superémonos this year;  
    they may have participated in 2001.            
 
  
Table 3. Effect of Receiving Superémonos on Probability of School Attendance: 2001 
Results of Probit Analysis, Children Ages 12 to 15 in Urban Areas of San Jose, 
Alajuela and Cartago 
 
                  
              standard  P  marginal 
           coefficient    error  value  effect 
                   
    Superémonos 2001 (d)    0.349 *    0.137  0.011  0.029 
  child's  age    -0.573 *    0.069  0.000  -0.050 
    female child (d)    -0.135     0.125  0.280  -0.012 
    child is white (d)    0.038     0.127  0.764  0.003 
  mother's  education    0.059 **    0.028  0.036  0.005 
    mother is absent (d)    -0.278     0.240  0.248  -0.030 
  Alajuela  (d)    -0.950 *    0.267  0.000  -0.165 
  Cartago  (d)    -0.249 ***  0.140  0.076  -0.023 
  Crowding      -0.185 *    0.053  0.000  -0.016 
  potable  water  (d)    -0.054     0.244  0.825  -0.005 
    bathroom internal (d)    -0.137     0.132  0.299  -0.012 
    running electricity (d)    0.395     0.362  0.276  0.048 
  total  rooms    -0.064     0.075  0.390  -0.006 
    block walls (d)    -0.112     0.190  0.555  -0.010 
  prefab  walls  (d)    -0.171     0.200  0.391  -0.016 
    other type walls (d)    -0.438 **    0.214  0.041  -0.051 
    home owner (d)    -0.222     0.165  0.179  -0.018 
    parent has a home business (d)  0.307     0.247  0.213  0.022 
    minutes to the bus stop    0.021     0.014  0.143  0.110 
    minutes to reach primary school  -0.001     0.001  0.297  -0.004 
    minutes to reach secondary school  -0.005 ***  0.002  0.051  -0.025 
    minutes to bus imputed     0.424     0.758  0.576  0.026 
    minutes to secondary school imputed  -0.023     0.389  0.953  -0.002 
  constant      10.615 *    1.318  0.000   
                   
    Number of observations    1109            
  Pseudo  R-squared  0.226             
    Mean of dependent variable  0.913         
                  
  Notes:   
    * Significant at .01 level. 
    ** Significant at .05 level. 
    *** Significant at .10 level.   
   Observations in which time reported was missing were imputed at average of non-missing variables.  
     A dummy variable (imputed) captures whether imputed values were used.    
   Marginal effects for time variables were calculated per hour, rather than per minute.   
   (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy variable.             
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Table 4. Effect of Receiving Superémonos on Probability of Passing School Year: 2001 
Results of Probit Analysis, Children Ages 12 to 15 in Urban Areas of San Jose, 
Alajuela and Cartago 
 
            
       standard  P  marginal 
     coefficient    error  value  effect 
          
Superémonos 2001 (d)                      0.180***  0.098  0.067  0.048 
child's age  -0.226 *  0.044  0.000  -0.062 
female child (d)  0.104  0.094  0.269  0.028 
child is white (d)    -0.157 ***  0.094  0.095  -0.043 
mother's education  -0.011   0.020  0.578  -0.003 
mother is absent (d)  0.020   0.206  0.922  0.005 
Alajuela (d)  -0.258   0.229  0.259  -0.077 
Cartago (d)  -0.135     0.103  0.189  -0.037 
crowding     -0.080 ***  0.044  0.066  -0.022 
potable water (d)    -0.005   0.192  0.980  -0.001 
bathroom internal (d)    0.019   0.113  0.868  0.005 
running electricity (d)    0.715 **  0.284  0.012  0.244 
total rooms    -0.009   0.055  0.870  -0.002 
block walls (d)    0.090   0.133  0.499  0.024 
prefab walls (d)    -0.126   0.139  0.363  -0.035 
other type walls (d)    -0.015   0.165  0.925  -0.004 
home owner (d)    -0.087   0.116  0.452  -0.023 
parent has a home business (d)  -0.158   0.155  0.307  -0.045 
minutes to the bus stop    -0.005   0.008  0.487  -0.060 
time to reach primary school -0.001   0.001  0.346  -0.013 
time to reach secondary school 0.005 **  0.003 0.030  0.089 
time to bus imputed     -0.716   0.719  0.319  -0.246 
time to secondary 
school imputed  0.253 0.360  0.482  0.062 
constant   3.712 *  0.854  0.000   
             
Number of observations    1004          
Pseudo R-squared  0.061          
Mean of dependent variable  0.913         
              
Notes:     
* Significant at .01 level.   
** Significant at .05 level.   
*** Significant at .10 level. 
Observations in which time reported was missing were imputed at average of non-missing variables.   
A dummy variable (imputed) captures whether imputed values were used. Marginal effects for time 
variables were calculated per hour, rather than per minute. 
(d) indicates that the variable is a dummy variable. 
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Table 5. Effect of Receiving Superémonos on School Attendance: 2002 
Results of Probit Analysis, Children Ages 13 to 16 in Urban Areas 
of San Jose, Alajuela and Cartago 
 
     coefficient  
Standard 
error P  value 
Marginal 
effect 
             
Superémonos 2002 (d)   0.250 *** 0.137  0.068  0.044 
child's age    -0.422 *  0.050  0.000  -0.082 
female child (d)    -0.123   0.101  0.225  -0.024 
child is white (d)    -0.066   0.102  0.521  -0.013 
mother's education    0.050 ** 0.023 0.029  0.010 
mother is absent (d)    -0.281   0.201  0.162  -0.063 
Alajuela (d)    -0.302   0.256  0.240  -0.068 
Cartago (d)    -0.516 *  0.110  0.000  -0.108 
crowding     -0.120 *  0.044  0.007  -0.023 
potable water (d)    -0.177   0.178  0.322  -0.034 
bathroom internal (d)    -0.070   0.109  0.524  -0.014 
running electricity (d)   0.382   0.290  0.187  0.091 
total rooms    -0.023   0.060  0.699  -0.004 
block walls (d)    -0.055   0.149  0.713  -0.011 
prefab walls (d)    -0.136  0.155  0.380  -0.027 
other type walls (d)    -0.310 *** 0.172 0.071  -0.068 
home owner (d)    -0.171   0.131  0.193  -0.032 
parent has 
 a home business (d)  0.016  0.179  0.928  0.003 
minutes to the bus stop   0.008   0.006  0.226  0.090 
minutes to reach primary 
school  0.001 *** 0.001 0.069  0.016 
minutes to reach secondary 
school -0.005 *  0.002  0.008  -0.001 
minutes to bus (imputed)    -0.504   0.669  0.451  -0.128 
minutes to secondary school 
 (imputed)   -0.634 ** 0.285 0.026  -0.168 
constant     7.874 * 0.953  0.000   
              
Number of observations    1109          
Pseudo R-squared 
0.15
9        
Mean of dependent variable 
0.84
4       
      
Notes:  * Significant at .01 level; ** Significant at .05 level; *** Significant at .10 level. 
Observations in which time reported was missing were imputed at average of non-
missing variables.  A dummy variable (imputed) captures whether imputed values were 
used.  Marginal effects for time variables were calculated per hour, rather than per 
minute. (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy variable.  
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Table 6. Effect of Receiving Superémonos on Probability of Child Working in Reference Week: 
2002 (Results of Probit Analysis, Children Ages 13 to 16 in Urban Areas of San Jose, 
 Alajuela and Cartago) 
   
         standard  P  marginal 
     coefficient   error  value  effect 
              
Superémonos 2002 (d)    0.076  0.152  0.619  0.009 
child's age    0.318*  0.059  0.000  0.035 
female child (d)    -0.515*  0.128  0.000  -0.057 
child is white (d)    0.241***  0.124  0.052  0.026 
mother's education    -0.066**  0.027  0.014  -0.007 
mother is absent (d)    -0.055  0.258  0.831  -0.006 
Alajuela (d)    -0.042  0.332  0.898  -0.005 
Cartago  (d)    0.376** 0.131 0.004 0.045 
crowding      0.015  0.057 0.789 0.002 
potable  water  (d)    0.373** 0.186 0.044 0.041 
bathroom internal (d)    -0.013  0.135  0.924  -0.001 
running electricity (d)    -0.541  0.336  0.108  -0.088 
total  rooms    0.054  0.073 0.459 0.006 
block walls (d)    0.042  0.171  0.805  0.005 
prefab walls (d)    -0.029  0.180  0.872  -0.003 
other type walls (d)    -0.177  0.221  0.424  -0.018 
home owner (d)    0.049  0.155  0.753  0.005 
parent has a home business (d)  0.575*  0.173  0.001  0.091 
minutes to the bus stop    -0.008  0.007  0.249  -0.054 
time to reach primary school   -0.001  0.001  0.327  -0.006 
time to reach secondary school  0.006*  0.002  0.010  0.038 
time to bus imputed     1.502***  0.776  0.053  0.402 
time to secondary school imputed   0.420  0.353  0.233  0.063 
constant     -6.150*  1.106  0.000   
             
Number of observations    1109          
Pseudo R-squared  0.163          
Mean of dependent variable  0.086         
Notes: * Significant at .01 level; ** Significant at .05 level; *** Significant at .10 level.  
Observations in which time reported was missing were imputed at average of non-missing variables.   
A dummy variable (imputed) captures whether imputed values were used. Marginal effects for time 
variables were calculated per hour, rather than per minute.  
(d) indicates that the variable is a dummy variable. 
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Table 7.  Effect of Receiving Superémonos on Attendance, Passing Grade 
and Child Labor: Urban Areas of San Jose, Alajuela and Cartago 
Results of One-to-One Propensity Score Matching 
 
             
    number of    mean of       
  observations  number  of  matched  marginal     
    in treatment   unmatched  obs. In  effect of  standard  T 
   group  observations control  group Superémonos  error  test 
              
2001 
1       
              
Attend  
last year  419 1  0.888  0.050**  0.025  2.036 
              
              
Pass 
last year  419 1  0.782 0.035  0.036  0.987 
              
              
             
2002 
2      
             
Attend 
this year  206 0  0.782  0.087**  0.042  2.103 
              
              
Work 
last week  206 0  0.073 0.019  0.030  0.642 
             
             
 
Notes:  ** Difference in mean between treatment and control group is significant at .05 
level.  
1  Beneficiaries aged 12 to 15; Control group composed of individuals who did not receive 
Superémonos last year. 
2  Beneficiaries aged 13 to 16; Control group composed of individuals who did not receive 
Superémonos this year; they may have participated in 2001. 
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Table 8.  Marginal Impacts of Superémonos on Outcomes of Interest 
 
  Attend school 






Naïve means comparison  3.9 
ppts 
-- --  -- 
        




4.8 ppts  -- 
        








Impacts are difference in means (treatment minus control) in the case of 
naïve means comparison and propensity score matching.  For the probit 
regression analysis the impacts are the predicted marginal effects.  All 
impacts are measured in terms of percentage points. 
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Appendix A.  Steps in Propensity Score Matching  
 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a technique used to form control groups that closely 
resemble treatment groups. Rather than match on just one or two key characteristics (e.g., age, 
sex), PSM attempts to form a control group in which the a priori likelihood of participating in the 
evaluated program is similar between the two groups.   
The main steps in PSM are the following: 
 
•  Collect a representative sample of program participants and non-
participants.  The sample of non-participants is typically significantly 
larger than that of participants, in order to facilitate finding good matches.   
•  Pool the two samples (participants and non-participants) and estimate a 
logit or probit model of program participation, using all relevant 
explanatory variables. 
•  Create the predicted values of program participation; these are called 
“propensity scores.”  There will be propensity scores for all individuals in 
the data set, whether participant or non-participant.  
•  Exclude any individuals from the non-participant sample whose predicted 
probability of participation is outside the range of probabilities found in 
the participant sample.  (Typically, observations are excluded because the 
estimated participation probabilities are too low.) 
•  For each individual in the treatment sample (participants), identify the 
individual or individuals in the control sample (non-participants) with the 
closest estimated probabilities.  If one individual is selected in the control 
sample for each individual in the treatment sample, this is termed “one-to-
one matching.”  If more than one individual in the control sample is 
matched to each individual in the treatment sample, this is termed “n-to-
one matching.”  The most common value of n-to-one matching is five-to-
one.  The matched observation(s) in the control sample are termed 
“nearest neighbor(s)”.   
•  Calculate the mean value of the outcome indicator or indicators (e.g., 
attend school, pass grade, work) for the nearest neighbor(s). The   27
difference between this mean and the corresponding value for the 
individual in the treatment sample is the estimate of the gain or loss due to 
program participation for that individual. 
Calculate the mean of all these individual gains or losses to obtain the overall mean gain or loss. 
 
Source: World Bank (2000). 
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Appendix B. Areas of Common Support for Treatment and Control Groups 
 
Distribution of Propensity Score Among Treated (received Superémonos in 2001) 



















Distribution of Propensity Score Among Untreated (did not receive Superémonos in 2001) 

















Note: The matched control group is drawn from this group. 
 